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I. Articles
Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview
by Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen
Abstract
How do terrorists move money?  !is article examines six of the most widely used methods: cash 
couriers, informal transfer systems (e.g. hawala), money service businesses, formal banking, false 
trade invoicing, and high value commodities.  When terrorists move money, they choose methods 
that take into account issues of: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs, and speed. !is article 
analyzes the methods according to these issues. It draws on multiple cases and examples, including 
the most recent cases of Hezbollah’s and al Shabaab’s use of money service businesses, and many 
others.
Shortly a!er the 9/11 attacks, U.S. federal agents received a tip-o" from a con#dential 
informant that a Yemeni sheik was raising money in Brooklyn for al-Qaeda. $e sheik had 
allegedly boasted in recorded conversations that he had raised as much as US $20 million for 
Osama bin Laden. Some of the money was raised in cash donations, but cash is bulky and di%cult 
to move. Depositing the cash in a formal bank and wire transferring it to Yemen would have 
raised red &ags. So the sheik arranged to have the bulk cash shipped in cargo. When the agents 
arrested two men at Kennedy Airport in October 2001, they found US $140,000 of cash hidden in 
cardboard boxes along with honey jars.[1] It wasn’t the #rst time the honey trade had been used to 
disguise the movement of money. In the months leading up to 9/11, the same Yemeni honey 
trading businesses imported over-invoiced honey to disguise money &owing to the United States.
[2] 
How terrorists move money, and how this can be disrupted, is o!en overlooked. Instead, 
scholars and policy-makers focus on either the sources of terrorist #nancing or the things 
terrorists spend money on, like weapons and the attacks themselves.[3] Yet the movement of 
money is a critical intermediary step. Terrorist groups o!en raise money in places di"erent from 
where they are located and di"erent from where attacks might take place. For terrorist groups to 
be e"ective, they must be able to move money from its origins to the operational areas where it is 
needed. $ese transfers of money represent potential weak points which the state can target to 
more e"ectively disrupt the terrorist organization and its operations. 
Given the range of possible methods for terrorists to move funds, why do terrorist groups 
choose a particular method or combination of methods from the possible options? $e following 
section will explore what the broad attributes might be for the movement of money. $e 
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subsequent section will describe the primary methods used to transfer money and will include 
how each method has advantages and disadvantages according to the attributes laid out in the 
earlier section. $e #nal section will discuss how better countermeasures can be developed to 
better address the movement of terrorist #nances. 
Attributes
When terrorists move money, what kinds of issues might they be thinking of? Based on some 
evidence, as well as assumptions and inferred behavior, terrorists seem to choose methods of 
moving funds that take into account issues of: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs, and 
speed.[4] 
Volume: $e ability to move more money with each transaction makes it easier for terrorist 
groups to fund an operation. However, not all methods are capable of moving an equal volume of 
funds. Methods like formal banking, hawalas, and money transfer businesses can theoretically 
transfer an in#nite amount of money in a single transaction. In contrast, moving bulk cash is 
limited by the size and weight of the cash being transferred, with US $1 million in US $100 bills 
weighing over 20 pounds; and in US $20 bill denominations, more than 100 pounds. Such a load 
would also take up a lot of space. Despite what is o!en portrayed in the movies, a typical briefcase 
can #t just over US $250,000 in used US $100 bills, or a mere US $50,000 in US $20 bills.
Risk: For terrorist groups, there are several types of risks they might face depending on the 
method of fund transfer. Among the most obvious risks is that the transfer itself will be detected 
by authorities. For example, a transfer between two banks is much more likely to be monitored, 
recorded, and discovered, than a transfer of cash that crosses the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. A related element of risk comes from the varying degrees of anonymity associated with 
each method of moving funds. Some methods, like formal banking, require institutions to follow 
“know your customer” (KYC) practices, while others, like hawalas or cash, allow for more 
anonymity. 
Another risk for terrorists is the reliability of di"erent methods. $ere is a high degree of 
certainty that transfers made between banks and between hawalas, for example, will be made 
accurately and completely. Cash transfers, on the other hand, may be less reliable because of the 
opportunities for the! along the way. And because of their bulk, they may be more vulnerable to 
seizure by law enforcement.
Convenience: Depending on their physical location, some methods for moving funds may be 
more or less convenient for a terrorist group. For example, using cash or hawalas to move money 
into or out of tribal areas in Iraq or Afghanistan is much more convenient than using formal 
banks. Likewise, al-Qaeda’s alleged trade in West African con&ict diamonds was more convenient 
than using cash or gold to move funds.[5] West Africa is geographically distant from South Asia, 
but diamonds are easy to hide, and therefore much more convenient than cash. Gold is less 
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convenient because of its weight and bulk, but given the importance of gold for dowries in both 
South Asia and the Middle East, and the number of large gold souks throughout the region, large 
shipments of gold in the form of high-end jewelry will not attract much notice. $e convenience 
of a particular method will clearly depend on geographic/topographic features (like an 
uncontrolled border) as well as demographic (cultural, ethnic, linguistic) factors. 
Simplicity: Everything being equal, terrorists would prefer methods that require the fewest 
number of steps, the lowest level of technology, and the least amount of skill. Given these 
parameters, terrorists are less likely to engage in elaborate money laundering schemes that involve 
numerous actors and that require dozens of complicated steps to obscure the trail of money. Using 
a scheme like the black market peso exchange, for example, would be much more complicated 
than a series of wire transfers through multiple bank accounts.[6]
Costs: Put simply, moving money requires the payment of fees. Western Union and 
MoneyGram charge users a transaction fee that can range anywhere from 1-10% depending on 
the amount being transferred and other transaction variables. Likewise, hawalas charge between 
0.5-2.5% on each transaction. Even moving cash across borders may require side payments to 
border guards or customs o%cials. 
Speed: Terrorists want to move money as quickly as possible to their #nal destination in order 
to fund their operational needs. Hawalas, for example, allow for transfers to occur relatively 
quickly, while formal banking may require deposits to sit for a day before they clear. Bulk cash 
smuggling can vary depending on how far the cash needs to move, and how many borders it 
needs to cross. A false trade invoicing scheme probably requires the longest amount of time to 
complete.[7]
Methods
$is section highlights the most used methods as well as some methods that are not used, but 
have been raised as potential future methods. For each method, we o"er a description of the 
method, some examples of how terrorists have used the method, and how we might think about 
each method according to the attributes described above. $e methods are presented from most 
simple to most complex.
Cash Couriers: Using couriers to move physical cash is the “simplest and oldest way of moving 
value.”[8] When criminals move cash across international borders, they typically conceal it in 
vehicles, packages, luggage, or anything else that can hold large physical volumes of cash.[9] 
O!entimes, where borders are uncontrolled or where the state’s resources are strained, criminals 
do not even conceal the cash.[10] 
AQ relied on couriers to move money in the 1990s and before the 9/11 attack. According to the 
9/11 Commission Monograph, al-Qaeda used money changers to transfer US $1 million from the 
UAE to Pakistan and then used couriers to transfer the funds as cash into Afghanistan. For the 
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM ! ! !!!            Volume 7, Issue 4
7!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!August 2013
9/11 attack itself, “Khalid Sheik Mohammed delivered…US $120,000 [in cash to] Abdul Aziz Ali 
in Dubai…[who] then used the cash to wire funds to the hijackers in the United States.”[11] 
Khalid Sheik Mohammed also gave thirteen of the hijackers US $10,000 each as they le! Pakistan. 
$ese hijackers brought cash and traveler’s checks with them as they entered the U.S. and 
deposited the funds at banks such as Bank of America, SunTrust, and other smaller banks. Others, 
like Ramzi Binalshibh and Mustafa al Hawsawi also used cash to fund the attack. Zacarious 
Moussaoui brought in the most cash, US $35,000, which he declared with Customs as he entered 
the country. (See Figure 1 for some of the cash transactions before the 9/11 attack.)
Figure 1: Cash Transfers before 9/11 Attacks
Cash couriers are used by other groups as well. For example, foreign #ghters traveling to Iraq 
to join AQI o!en brought cash with them. According to the captured records from Sinjar (on the 
Syrian border in northwestern Iraq), of the 590 records of foreign #ghters, 149 brought cash to 
AQI a!er entering Iraq. In general, almost all the di"erent nationalities had close to the same rate 
of #ghters contributing money (about 20-30%), but the Saudi #ghters contributed the largest 
amount in an absolute sense. $ey also comprised 22 of the 23 #ghters who brought in more than 
US $1,000.[12] Overall, these cash transfers were estimated to make up over 70% of AQI’s budget, 
highlighting the importance of this mechanism for both raising and moving funds into the 
organization.[13]
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Likewise, Jemaah Islamiyah has used cash couriers in the past as their primary method of 
moving funds. Before the Bali bombings in 2002, JI used two Indonesian laborers working in 
Malaysia to transfer over US $15,000 between terrorist members. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the 
al-Qaeda deputy and mastermind of 9/11, used a Pakistani courier to deliver US $50,000 to a JI 
leader in 2003 a!er the Bali attack.[14] JI also used cash transfers and couriers to move about US 
$8,500 to the bombers of the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in 2001.[15]
Security is an important consideration when using cash couriers. Terrorist networks will 
presumably use only trusted personnel to move the money. Another consideration is speed. 
Transferring funds with couriers is much slower than electronic means. It also requires some 
complex planning and coordination if couriers need to arrange the transfers.
Informal Transfer Systems: $ere are several types of informal #nancial networks, such as 
Hawala/Hundi in South Asia, Fei ch’ien in China, Phoe Khan in $ailand, and Door-to-Door in 
the Philippines.[16] $ese networks o!en have traditional roots and ethnic ties, and operate in 
places where the formal banking sector is less established or where large ethnic diasporas live. 
$ey are estimated to be part of a US $500 billion global remittance system.[17] Although most 
countries have legalized hawala (thinking that the networks will be easier to police if they operate 
openly), many hawaladars (hawala dealers) continue to operate illegally because of prohibitively 
high licensing and registration fees. Hawala networks were especially scrutinized a!er 9/11 due to 
evidence that al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) used them. 
Hawala networks in the Middle East and South Asia operate in the following manner: a worker 
in Dubai wants to send US $1,000 back to his wife in Pakistan. He #nds a hawaladar and gives 
him the funds. $e hawaladar contacts a fellow hawaladar (o!en an extended family member 
running a linked operation) in Pakistan. $e hawaladar in Dubai gives both the worker in Dubai 
and the hawaladar in Pakistan a transaction code. $e worker’s wife goes to the hawaladar in 
Pakistan and gives him the code. If the codes match, the hawaladar in Pakistan gives his wife the 
rupee equivalent of US $1,000 minus a small fee. (Note that no funds have actually crossed 
borders.) 
To settle the accounts, the simplest method is for the hawaladars to wait for a similar value of 
transactions to move in the other direction. As this rarely occurs, the hawaladars will periodically 
(weekly, or monthly) balance their books by using money service businesses, smuggling high 
value commodities, or false trade invoicing transactions to transfer funds. 
Although most customers use hawala for legitimate purposes, several terrorist groups have 
used hawalas to move money. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda “moved much of its money by hawala.”[18] 
$ey used “about a dozen trusted hawaladars” (as well as some unwitting hawaladars) in Pakistan, 
Dubai, and elsewhere in the Middle East.[19] While AQ used hawalas prior to 9/11, they did not 
use them speci#cally for the 9/11 plot.[20] 
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Besides al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba used hawala networks to move funds before their 2000 Red 
Fort attack in Delhi. Likewise, Dawood Ibrahim transferred funds via hawala networks before the 
1993 Mumbai attack.[21] In Iraq, terrorist groups have used hawala: two Iraqi Kurds were 
arrested for using hawalas to move part of nearly US $150,000 to #nance Ansar al-Sunna/Ansar al 
Islam.[22] Based on an author’s interview with a U.S. Special Forces colonel, we also know of 
coalition operations undertaken against hawaladars that were knowingly moving funds for Iraqi 
insurgent groups. Jemaah Islamiyah also used hawaladars to transfer about US $2,500 before a 
2001 attack.[23] 
A more recent example is the case of the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad. In 
February 2010 Mr. Shahzad’s handlers in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban)[24] arranged for US $4,900 
to be sent via an unregistered hawala network operated by two brothers, one of whom, A!ab Ali 
Khan, was an illegal Pakistani immigrant living in Brookline, Massachusetts. On February 24 or 
25th Mr. Ali Khan met Mr. Shahzad just outside of his Massachusetts apartment to hand over US 
$4,900 in cash.[25] $ere was no suggestion in any subsequent investigations that Mr. Ali Khan 
knew what the money would be used for. He was merely completing an anonymous business 
transaction. 
In April Mr. Shahzad received an additional tranche of funds from the Pakistani Taliban. 
Perhaps because of the inconvenient distance between Boston and New York, another hawala 
network was used. $is new network, operated by Mohammad Younis on Long Island and his 
brother in Pakistan, was also unregistered.[26] On April 10th, just three weeks before the 
bombings, Mr. Younis spoke to Mr. Shahzad by phone and arranged a meeting in a parking lot in 
Ronkonkoma, New York to hand over US $7,000 sent by Mr. Shahzad’s Pakistani Taliban 
handlers.[27] 
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Figure 2: Finances for Faisal Shahzad
Hawala and other informal transfer systems are fast, with transactions happening usually 
within hours, perhaps up to a day or slightly more for transactions to the more remote regions.
[28] $ey are also relatively anonymous. Hawaladars keep records, but these may o!en be done in 
their own shorthand, and their bookkeeping methods vary.[29] $ey may even be more reliable 
than other methods, like money service businesses, which serve similar communities.[30] $ey 
are also relatively inexpensive compared to other methods, charging just 1-2% for transfer fees 
and o!en o"ering a more competitive exchange rate –this is the primary reason why people use 
them. $ey are also convenient, operating in areas underserved by traditional banking. In 
Afghanistan, for example, $ompson notes that hawaladars operate in even the most remote areas 
of the country.[31] In the United States, informal transfer systems are required to register with 
FinCEN. In Afghanistan, there has been a similar e"ort to regulate the hawala network but both 
Afghanistan’s geography and the weakness of its institutions have prevented much progress.[32] 
Money Service Businesses: $e Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) de#nes money service businesses 
(MSBs) as “currency dealers or exchangers; check cashers; issuers [or redeemers] of traveler’s 
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checks, money orders, or stored value cards; and money transmitters.”[33] In the United States 
alone there are over 33,000 registered MSB’s.[34] Money service businesses are generally subject 
to the same regulations and laws as banks, and are subject to regulatory audits. However, unlike 
banks, MSBs do not follow similarly rigorous “know your customer” (KYC) procedures. Banks 
will only conduct transactions with people holding accounts at that bank, and those account 
holders must provide a signi#cant amount of personal information when they open the account. 
MSBs, on the other hand, do not require that customers have existing accounts. Customers only 
need to present a valid form of ID. Most MSBs, and particularly the more established money 
transmitters such as Western Union, transfer funds quickly (within minutes to most locations), 
are minimally expensive for transfers larger than US $1,000, and o"er low risks of detection, 
especially if the MSB is unregistered. 
In February 2013, a federal jury in San Diego convicted four Somali immigrants of conspiring 
to fund al Shabaab, a militant terrorist group in Somalia.[35] While all four men were involved in 
raising funds, one of them, Issa Doreh, worked at the Shidaal Express, a registered MSB from 
which he sent funds directly to one of al-Shabaab’s leaders, Aden Hashi Ayrow, who was in regular 
telephone contact with one of the other defendants. Months of wiretapped telephone 
conversations led to additional arrests in two related cases in St.Louis, Missouri and Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. Again, the goal was to raise funds for al-Shabaab and wire transfer those funds 
through registered MSB’s, getting lost in the tra%c of numerous legitimate remittances sent by the 
sizeable Somali immigrant communities in those cities. (See Figure 3)
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Figure 3: Operation Green Arrow
Before al-Qaeda o%cially existed, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Yousef, and Wali Khan 
Amin Shah used a large MSB in the UAE, Al Ansari Exchange Establishment (AAEE), to move 
funds for the Operation Bojinka plot in 1995.[36] Al-Qaeda also made extensive use of MSBs in 
their #nancing of the 9/11 attacks. An AQ #nancier, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali deposited almost US 
$120,000 at two MSBs in Dubai: the Wall Street Exchange Center and the UA Exchange Center. 
$e money was transferred to the hijackers’ U.S. bank accounts through the MSBs’ correspondent 
accounts at the Royal Bank of Canada and Citibank, respectively. Even though the MSBs in Dubai 
required identi#cation, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali used aliases. His transactions also appeared 
unremarkable among the millions of MSB transactions &owing out of that jurisdiction. A second 
#nancier, Binalshib, transferred about US $8,500 via two Traveler’s Express/MoneyGram 
transactions and two Western Union transactions.[37] (See Figure 4) 
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Figure 4: Money Service Business Transfers before 9/11 Attacks
Perhaps the terrorism #nancing case study that highlights the role of MSB’s most glaringly is the 
complex Hezbollah #nancing case that entrapped and eventually undid Lebanese Canadian Bank 
in 2011. While the Lebanese Canadian Bank case has many layers (and more will be said about 
the case in the next section), one critical component of the money laundering operation allegedly 
run by Hezbollah involved the placement of cash into money service businesses located in Beirut. 
$ese MSB’s had accounts with Lebanese Canadian Bank. $e scheme originated in the Western 
Hemisphere with drug proceeds from Ayman Joumaa’s drug tra%cking network. Although 
Joumaa, himself, was not a member of Hezbollah, he had loose connections with the organization, 
and found in them a willing partner in crime. 
Joumaa’s drug proceeds were laundered through a complicated scheme involving the purchase 
of used cars from Lebanese-owned dealerships in the United States.[38] $e used cars were 
shipped to Africa where they were sold for cash. Additional drug cash was co-mingled with the 
proceeds of the car sales, and this cash was sent to at least two money service businesses in Beirut, 
including Elissa Exchange and the Hassan Ayash Exchange (See Figure 5). Both of these MSB’s 
were allegedly complicit in the scheme, and allegedly earned commissions on their laundering 
services, which went straight into the co"ers of Hezbollah. When the scandal was laid bare, both 
MSB’s were shut down, and Joumaa’s drug tra%cking network was forced to #nd another channel 
through which to launder their funds.
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Figure 5: Hezbollah Financing Scheme Pre-2011
According to a recent Treasury sanctions designation in April 2013, it did not take long for 
Joumaa to #nd a new channel for laundering his funds. Elissa Exchange and Hassan Ayash 
Exchange were soon replaced by two other Beirut-based, Hezbollah-linked money services 
businesses: Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and the Hawali Exchange Co.[39] $e designation 
by Treasury alleged that between March 2011 and October 2012 Rmeiti Exchange collected bulk 
cash, issued cashier’s checks and facilitated cross border wire transfers for a variety of criminals, 
including “Hezbollah a%liates.” (See Figure 6) Hawali Exchange was charged with similar, albeit 
more complex, transactions. Such designations essentially bring a #nancial institution’s operations 
to a halt, as it becomes almost impossible to conduct U.S. dollar transactions. $e designation 
decision set a new precedent, for it was the #rst time Treasury had used Section 311 of the Patriot 
Act against a money service business. Previous designations had been limited to formal banks. 
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM ! ! !!!            Volume 7, Issue 4
15! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!August 2013
Figure 6: Hezbollah Financing Scheme Post-2011
Up until this case and the successful e"orts on the part of the U.S. Treasury Department to take 
down four well-known Lebanese money services businesses, MSB’s had been considered an 
advantageous method for moving terrorist funds. $ey allow for the relatively inexpensive and 
speedy transmission of funds, their omnipresence is convenient, and even though their cash 
reporting threshold is low, it is still possible in theory to move a large volume of funds at any 
given time. But the risks have changed in recent years. Previously, MSB’s &ew under the radar and 
faced a lower risk of external audits or careful scrutiny by #nancial regulators. Renewed attention 
on their activities has put them in the spotlight, and many MSB’s in North America are now 
#nding it di%cult to establish accounts with formal banks, who do not wish to take on the 
additional risks. 
Formal Banking: $e formal banking sector includes depository #nancial institutions (DFIs) – 
banks, saving and loans, and credit unions – which are the sole entities permitted “to engage in 
the business of receiving deposits and providing access to those deposits” through a payment 
system of checks, electronic networks, credit and debit cards, and bank-to-bank transfers.[40] $e 
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formal banking sector is heavily regulated in the West, and increasingly so in most emerging 
market countries. In the U.S. laws like the Bank Secrecy Act (and its most recent amendments in 
Title III of the USAPATRIOT Act) require banks to maintain records, know their customers, 
report transactions over US $10,000 and report suspicious transactions of any amount. However, 
banks are still vulnerable to abuse by terrorists and other criminals. 
Banks can be a vehicle for criminal #nancing in a variety of ways. $e most convenient 
arrangement for a terrorist would be a bank that asks no questions, such as the former al-Madina 
Bank in Lebanon. Alternatively, the bank could have a crooked employee, who facilitates the 
laundering and movement of funds under the nose of unwitting supervisors, as happened with 
Lebanese Canadian Bank. And if a bank is not careful, it could also be used for criminal activity 
by way of correspondent accounts or payable-through-accounts of correspondent banks, as was 
the case with HSBC. And #nally, there may be instances where a bank does all it is required to do 
with respect to customer due diligence, but the transactions still fail to set o" any red &ags, as 
happened with the 9/11 hijacker accounts.
Al-Madina Bank, and its subsidiary, United Credit Bank (UCB), represent a notorious case of 
deceitful corruption. When their crimes were uncovered in 2003, their unorthodox transactions 
caused the bank’s collapse and the loss of depositors’ funds. Purchased by two Lebanese-Saudi 
brothers in 1984, the bank soon fell under the de facto control of a woman named Rana Qoleilat, 
who started out as a mere executive assistant, but was soon given power of attorney to conduct 
transactions on behalf of the two owners. According to prosecutors’ allegations, Ms. Qoleilat 
knowingly facilitated the laundering of funds by Saddam Hussein’s sanctioned regime, con&ict 
diamond dealers, Russian ma#a groups, and an arms dealer for Hezbollah.[41] She is also alleged 
to have embezzled funds from the bank to enrich powerful Syrian generals and politicians during 
the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. However, because the bank was run like a Ponzi scheme, the 
entire operation eventually collapsed. Most depositors eventually recovered their funds, but the 
owners lost an estimated US $1.5 billion.[42]
$e Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), mentioned earlier, was implicated in Hezbollah #nancing 
at a number of levels. $e bank held accounts for money service businesses that were allegedly 
laundering and earning commissions for Hezbollah, but the bank was also held liable for allowing 
a handful of crooked senior bank managers to structure cash deposits right under the unwatchful 
eye of compliance sta".[43] $ese crooked employees received funds from Hezbollah couriers, 
who would bring the bulk cash directly from the airport, and deposit the funds at a nearby LCB 
branch.
Even when a bank carefully scrutinizes its employees, it can still be used for terrorism 
#nancing by way of contaminated correspondent accounts. Correspondent accounts are accounts 
set up to allow o"-shore banks to conduct transactions in a key currency such as the U.S. dollar. 
For example, any foreign bank that wishes to conduct dollar transactions must #rst set up a 
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correspondent account with a U.S. bank to process those dollar transactions. Correspondent 
accounts are an unavoidable tool for conducting international transactions. $e problem arises 
because the U.S.-based bank cannot guarantee that the foreign correspondent bank is carefully 
screening its own customers and its customers’ activities. $at is why correspondent relationships 
take time to establish. Most large international banks will not set up a correspondent relationship 
with an overseas bank without #rst conducting an on-site visit and evaluation of the other bank’s 
risk compliance regime. Unfortunately, such due diligence and care was not undertaken by 
HSBC-US when it continued to maintain a correspondent account relationship with al-Rajhi 
Bank of Saudi Arabia, a!er several allegations of connections to terrorism #nancing. $e #rst 
allegations arose in 2005 when two individuals were indicted for using al-Rajhi bank to send 
money to violent extremists in Chechnya. Additional concerns arose in 2007 when the contents of 
a 2003 CIA report were leaked. $e report found that “senior al-Rajhi family members have long 
supported Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their bank.”[44] In spite of all 
of these red &ags, HSBC-US continued to conduct correspondent account transactions with al-
Rajhi Bank until they were investigated for many additional compliance failures.
In the execution of the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda used the formal banking sector as their primary 
method of moving and storing funds. All told, they deposited around US $300,000 in U.S. banks, 
and spent all but US $36,000 of that before the attacks. About US $130,000 of the funds the 
hijackers used came through bank-to-bank transfers (including through MSB correspondent 
accounts at banks) and the rest was deposited as cash. Once these funds arrived in the United 
States they were deposited in accounts at Union Bank of California and Sun Trust Bank in 
Florida, among others. All the hijackers opened accounts at these U.S. banks with their real 
identities. $ey accessed their funds with ATM and debit cards. An additional US $47,600 was 
deposited in overseas banks: US $9,600 in Saudi British Bank in Saudi Arabia, US $8,000 in a 
Citibank branch o%ce in the UAE, and US $30,000 in a Standard Chartered Bank branch in the 
UAE. Two of the hijackers accessed these overseas accounts with ATM and Visa cards.[45] What 
is remarkable is that most of these transactions, because of their relatively small size and the lack 
of suspicion about the would-be hijackers, would not have set o" any red &ags even today. 
Formal banking has several advantages and disadvantages for terrorist groups. In general, 
banks are largely regulated and therefore pose higher risks for terrorists of detection by 
investigators. Al-Qaeda, however, overcame some of these drawbacks by utilizing bank branches 
in the UAE and Pakistan, which at the time lacked much regulatory oversight, and by allowing 
mostly low-level (unknown to law enforcement) operatives to use banks for the 9/11 plot.[46] 
$ey are safe and convenient, but can be expensive (based on fees and exchange rates), and can be 
slow if the banks hold the money for a period of time before authorizing transfers.[47]
False Trade Invoicing: One of the most di%cult laundering methods to detect is false trade 
invoicing, which is why it is estimated to be the one of the most heavily utilized methods by both 
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organized crime and terrorist groups for moving funds internationally.[48] False trade invoicing 
disguises the transmission of value from one jurisdiction to another. $is can be done through 
over-invoicing or under-invoicing.[49] If a U.S.-based terrorist purchases some American honey, 
and then exports that honey to Yemen, he could overprice the shipment by US $100,000 without 
attracting much attention. When the Yemeni importer pays for the overpriced honey, some of that 
money will go towards paying o" the U.S. honey producer. $e additional US $100,000 goes right 
into the pocket of the fellow terrorist in the U.S., who arranged for the shipment. According to 
one government source, this is believed to have happened in the months leading up to 9/11.[50] 
When investigators followed leads connected to the 9/11 hijackers they ran into a number of 
suspicious transactions related to the Middle East honey trade. $anks to a tip-o" from a 
con#dential informant, agents rushed to Kennedy Airport to #nd two suspects stashing US 
$140,000 in cash inside a honey shipment bound for the Middle East.[51] Learning of the 
suspicious honey transactions, Professor John Zdanowicz at Florida International University took 
it upon himself to run through all of the Commerce Department data on honey imports and 
exports between the U.S. and al-Qaeda watch list countries in the months leading up to 9/11. 
What he found raised a number of eyebrows, particularly for honey exported to Yemen. Although 
Yemen is known for its honey trade, importing 600 metric tons per year and exporting its own 
special brand of honey from the ancient Sidr tree,[52] these transactions were nevertheless highly 
unusual, suggesting the surreptitious movement of funds from Yemen to the U.S. $e 
investigation ultimately led to the listing of the Yemen-based Al Nur Honey Center, Al Nur Honey 
Press Shop and the Al-Shifa Honey Press for Industry and Commerce on OFAC’s list of 
designated terrorism-related entities.[53] 
Of all of the methods of moving terrorist funds, false trade invoicing o"ers many advantages 
for criminal organizations. While it is not simple and can be quite time consuming, it is incredibly 
convenient if the group already has front companies to conduct the transactions. Traditionally, the 
risk of detection has been quite low, but with the continued establishment of Trade Transparency 
Units (TTU’s) around the world, this risk is rising. In addition to assisting with port security, 
Trade Transparency Units attempt to scour big data, searching for unusually priced transactions.
[54] While this method is unlikely to catch falsely-invoiced shipments in real time, the paper trail 
related to the discovered transactions can be a starting point for money laundering and terrorism 
#nancing investigations.
High-value commodities: Valuable commodities like gold and diamonds o"er yet another 
convenient method for transmitting value across borders. Gold is an especially reliable form of 
transportable payment during times of strife, or when #at currencies are heavily devalued or not 
easily convertible. Gold can also be smelted into any shape and disguised for easy transport. Its 
weight, quality and price can be easily determined, and it is nearly impossible to trace its origin.
[55] In addition to these advantages, gold is extremely important in Middle Eastern and South 
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Asian cultures. Bridal dowries are o!en presented in the form of high quality gold jewelry. $e 
region is also home to the world’s largest gold souks (markets), so the transport of gold by 
travelers is not likely to raise eyebrows. For these reasons, it should come as no surprise that gold 
has been o"ered as a reward incentive by both al Qaeda and the Taliban for would-be jihadists.
[56] Other groups such as the militant right-wing Posse Comitatus in the U.S., and the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult in Japan, have been known to store and trade gold.[57]
Diamonds and their use by terrorists groups are more controversial, with researchers divided 
over the reliability and weight of the evidence. $ere is little doubt that Hezbollah has a hand in 
the diamond business, especially give the large Lebanese diaspora involved in the African 
diamond trade.[58] What is more controversial is the extent to which al Qaeda and its a%liates 
have used diamonds to store or move value. $e #rst allegations arose not long a!er 9/11 when 
Douglas Farah, a Washington Post reporter at the time, declared a connection,[59] but there were 
many doubters. A brief FBI investigation soon a!er 9/11 turned up nothing, but more evidence 
began to surface in the following years, especially with the capture and questioning of Ahmed 
Ghailani in Pakistan in 2004. Ghailani, a senior al-Qaeda operative, confessed to buying con&ict 
diamonds and spent a great deal of time traveling in and out of West African con&ict zones 
between 1999 and 2002.[60] $ere were also a lot of questions raised about Aa#a Siddiqui, an 
MIT-trained Pakistani microbiologist and al-Qaeda sympathizer, who was captured by U.S. forces 
and now sits in a Texas prison, sentenced to 86 years for trying to kill Americans. She is alleged to 
have traveled to Liberia to purchase con&ict diamonds prior to 9/11.[61] Why would al-Qaeda 
resort to the diamond trade? A!er the 1998 East African embassy bombings the Clinton 
Administration froze more than US $220 million of assets belonging to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
$e organization needed to convert its remaining assets into something transportable, which 
could not easily be traced or seized.[62]
Gold and diamonds clearly o"er many obvious advantages for a terrorist. Diamonds are 
especially easy to transport and hide, and both are easy to convert into cash. But obtaining 
diamonds and gold from the source (such as African mines) is neither simple nor convenient. 
$ey need to be transported by hand, and that always carries the risk of seizure or the!. Where 
valuable commodities continue to play a major role is in settling hawala accounts, for both 
criminal and law abiding hawaladars.[63]
Other methods: $e methods described above are the most common way terrorists move 
money. However, it is worth mentioning that there are other methods that criminals use, but, so 
far, have not been used extensively by terrorists groups. One relatively new, and widely discussed, 
method is the use of stored value cards (SVCs).[64] “Closed” cards are tied to a particular 
business, while “open” cards, like prepaid debit cards, can be used anywhere. $ese cards, 
especially the open ones, “provide a compact, easily transportable, and potentially anonymous 
way” to move funds.[65] While drug dealers and money launderers have used SVCs, terrorists 
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have not been known to use them in any meaningful way.[66] Likewise, casinos are o!en 
mentioned as a venue for criminal money laundering, but we have found no evidence that 
terrorists utilize them for moving funds. As another example, digital currencies, like Bitcoin, are 
increasingly being used by criminals, especially drug dealers, but we have seen little evidence that 
terrorists are using them.[67] A 2008 report lists several examples of criminals using new 
payment methods (NPMs), like digital currencies, stored-value cards, and mobile payments, but 
lists just a single example of terrorists selling phone cards to raise funds.[68]
Conclusion
To sum up, terrorist groups utilize multiple methods for moving funds, demonstrating how 
they are &exible and adaptive; when one method becomes riskier or costlier, they move to other 
methods. Terrorists also take advantage of legal and regulatory di"erences between states, #nding 
the seams where they can work. $is makes stopping terrorist #nancial &ows a challenging 
problem. 
To counter the movement of terrorist funds, there are reporting requirements for banks and 
non-bank #nancial institutions, as well as a loosely coordinated international regime consisting of 
organizations like the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units which share #nancial 
intelligence, and FATF-style regional bodies that evaluate member states’ compliance regimes. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to describe the full regime here, as others have done so more than 
adequately.[69] $is regime has had a mixed record of success, despite insu%cient international 
coordination, de#cient capacity, and inadequate implementation in many countries. For example, 
al-Qaeda especially, but also Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Hamas, and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group have been unable to maintain their levels of violence because of #nancial di%culties.[70] 
Additionally, #nancial data has been a key component in prosecuting terrorism cases, with FBI 
special agents o!en making use of SAR #lings. $is is because #nancial transactions leave 
“footprints” for law enforcement agencies to intercept and follow. And even when investigations 
do not begin with suspicious #nancial transactions, #nancial records can provide key evidence in 
piecing together the details of a case, as it did with the would-be Heathrow liquid explosive 
bombers in 2006.[71]
Despite these successes, there are also failures and challenges. For example, as the 9/11 
Commission noted, the regulatory regime in place before 9/11 did not fail, rather it was “never 
designed to detect or disrupt the transactions of the type that #nanced 9/11.”[72] $e point here is 
that there is no way to create a perfect regulatory and enforcement regime that can stop all 
criminal transactions. Nor would we want such a heavy regime, because then it would also 
impose costs on the vast majority of legal, legitimate transactions that occur within the #nancial 
system. 
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To return to the attributes described earlier, there is little countries can or should do to a"ect 
many of them, because so many methods are used for legitimate purposes. We do not want to 
decrease the potential volume of funds that can be transferred with any method (with the 
exception of cash transactions); nor do we want to make methods costlier, slower, more complex, 
or less convenient. 
Instead, the focus should be on making the risks of detection higher. Speci#cally, this means 
enhancing regulatory compliance at the ground level and improving international collaboration, 
cooperation, and capacity building, as well as prioritizing enforcement with non-compliant 
countries.[73] Making the transfer of funds riskier can be especially e"ective against the many 
terrorist groups who place a high value on the internal control of their operatives, even at the risk 
of operational security. For many groups, like al-Qaeda and its a%liates in Iraq and North Africa, 
they obsessively demand that their members keep detailed records of their #nancial transactions. 
$eir choice of “control” over “security” provides an important vulnerability that states can 
exploit.[74] 
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